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PRUDENTIAL STANDING, THE ZONE OF INTERESTS, AND
THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION
ABSTRACT
Threshold limitations on the availability of judicial review are ubiquitous
in the modern federal court system. While many are fact-specific and
malleable, the most foundational one, jurisdiction, is not. The D.C. Circuit
recently held that prudential standing, specifically the zone of interests test, is
a jurisdictional limitation on the court’s power to decide a case. This holding
directly contradicts several other circuits, which have held that prudential
standing is not jurisdictional and may be waived when the parties fail to raise
it. Twenty years ago, this decision likely would not have garnered much
attention because jurisdictional dismissals were common for a wide swath of
reasons. However, the Supreme Court has recently honed its concept of
jurisdiction and has cautioned courts to use the label sparingly.
The Supreme Court has referred to the zone of interests test repeatedly as a
prudential consideration⎯one that is judge-made. However, scholars and
courts alike have questioned this categorization and applied the test in a
conflicting manner. The categorization of the zone of interests test as a
constitutional, statutory, or prudential limitation is fundamental to determining
its function within the newly refined law of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, courts
have largely ignored this determination in recent treatments.
This Comment addresses that paucity, arguing that the Supreme Court has
built and sustained the zone of interests test on prudential standing grounds.
Prudential standing, properly understood in the context of the larger
prudential body of law, cannot function in a jurisdictional manner under the
Court’s recent cases. Accordingly, the zone of interests test, as currently
defined, should not be wielded in a jurisdictional manner.
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INTRODUCTION
“Unlike the Article III standing inquiry . . . prudential standing is not a
jurisdictional limitation on our review.”1
“[T]he theory plainly fails to demonstrate prudential standing. . . . We
therefore dismiss all petitions for lack of jurisdiction.”2
Litigants and courts alike face threshold limitations on the availability of
judicial review. Litigants, among other requirements, must possess standing to
bring their claims. Standing always requires plaintiffs satisfy the constitutional
requirements of Article III⎯injury in fact, causation, and redressability.3 In
addition to this constitutional minimum, plaintiffs must often satisfy a second
set of standing requirements, referred to as prudential standing. Prudential
standing is judge-made law and generally encompasses several separate
guidelines.4
Courts, on the other hand, have the responsibility to ensure that they only
intervene in cases when they have jurisdiction to do so. Jurisdiction can be
defined as the court’s power to hear and decide a case.5 Because courts must
refuse to hear a case when that power is lacking, they have an independent
responsibility to ensure their jurisdiction exists.6 Moreover, if jurisdiction is
found wanting at any point in litigation, the court must dismiss the case
immediately, sometimes even vacating a final judgment.7 Accordingly, a
court’s decision to interpret any doctrine or rule as a jurisdictional limitation
has sweeping consequences⎯it can yield untold hours of litigation moot and

1 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2 Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 179–80 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 704 F.3d 1005
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013), and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013), and cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2881 (2013).
3 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
4 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Generally, the three prudential standing doctrines are (1)
the prohibition against litigating generalized grievances, (2) the prohibition against litigating the rights of a
third party, and (3) the requirement that the plaintiff’s interest falls within the zone of interests that the statute
was designed to protect. Id. While all three will be addressed, this Comment focuses on the zone of interests
test.
5 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
6 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202
(2011).
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deny parties with uncontested Article III standing the opportunity to seek or
gain relief.8
Recently, food and automotive interest groups experienced this sting
firsthand in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA.9 Several groups
across industry lines challenged the EPA’s partial waivers of requirements for
the introduction of E15 gasoline into the energy market.10 While two of the
D.C. Circuit judges found that one group satisfied the requirements of Article
III standing,11 the split panel held that the same group failed to satisfy the zone
of interests test of prudential standing.12 Accordingly, the majority dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.13
Judge Kavanaugh dissented, writing, “[P]rudential standing is not
jurisdictional, meaning that it can be forfeited and need not be considered by
the court if the defendant or respondent does not assert it.”14 For Judge
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court’s pronounced effort to refine the application of
the “jurisdictional label” in recent years foreclosed its use in dismissing a case
for a lack of prudential standing.15 He highlighted the split that the decision
solidified between the D.C. Circuit and its sister circuits.16 Moreover, he
8 See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (“Branding a rule as going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
alters the normal operation of our adversarial system.”); see also Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648.
9 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 704 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2880 (2013), and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013), and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2881 (2013).
10 Id. at 172.
11 Id. at 179–80, 182. Only one group needed to satisfy the standing requirements. Id. at 175.
12 See id. at 182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 180 (majority opinion).
14 Id. at 182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The parties appealed directly from the agency decision but did
not raise prudential standing in the briefs or at oral argument. See id. at 171, 185. The intervenor raised the
challenge. Id. at 185 n.5. Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with the majority, which held that the court was required
to raise prudential standing sua sponte. See id. at 185. In any event, Judge Kavanaugh would have found that
the parties had prudential standing. Id. at 186.
15 See id. at 182–83. Notably, Judge Kavanaugh described the zone of interests test as a question of
whether Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 702 provided a cause of action to the aggrieved parties. See id.
at 183 & n.3. That cause of action does not speak to a court’s power to hear the case but rather the parties’
right of review. Id. at 183 n.3. For support, Judge Kavanaugh appealed to the circuit majority, which has
adopted this view. See id. at 184–85. That argument hinges upon the Supreme Court’s holding that a cause of
action goes to the merits of a claim and not the jurisdiction of the court. See infra notes 187–93 and
accompanying text. However, this Comment approaches the zone of interests test a step before Judge
Kavanaugh’s dissent, essentially arguing that the Supreme Court’s articulation of the zone of interests test
precludes even reading it as a statutory cause of action.
16 See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 184–85. The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits have all held that prudential standing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver. Id. The Second,
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have held to the contrary. See Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir.
2000); Cmty. First Bank v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1994); Animal Legal Def.
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stressed, this determination was far from an ethereal or hypothetical one⎯the
EPA likely would have lost on the merits had the court reached them.17
On the surface, whether the zone of interests test is jurisdictional should be
an easy question. The Court has repeatedly described the test as a prudential
consideration.18 As this Comment will discuss, the foundation of prudential
considerations rests not in external limitations imposed upon the Court, such as
those imposed by Article III of the Constitution, but in the Court’s caution to
exercise its own legitimate authority.19 However, the Court has also provided
seemingly conflicting foundations for the zone of interests test and called into
question its proper home among the prudential doctrines.20 Because of this
confusion, scholars have called for the Court to relocate the test to a more
appropriate position within its standing jurisprudence.21
This Comment will argue that the Court has planted and cultivated the zone
of interests test in the soil of prudential considerations. While several cases
may cast doubt on this determination, the Court’s recent jurisprudence
legitimizes the prudential reading as the correct one. This understanding is

Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248
(2d Cir. 1994).
17 Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 704 F.3d 1005, 1005, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(denying petition for rehearing en banc) (“The panel’s standing holding is outcome-determinative because
EPA will lose if we reach the merits. The E15 waiver plainly violates the statutory text.”). While not failsafe,
Judge Kavanaugh’s conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Judge Tatel, who concurred in the panel judgment,
indicated that he personally agreed that prudential standing should not be jurisdictional. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n,
693 F.3d at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring). He would have reached the merits if the D.C. Circuit precedent did not
clearly state that a lack of prudential standing was jurisdictional. See id.
18 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). It should be noted from the outset that these
terms⎯“prudential standing” and “zone of interests”⎯are not interchangeable. The confusion in Grocery
Manufacturers stems, in part, from conflation of the terms. The actual holding of the case was not that the
zone of interests test is jurisdictional, but that prudential standing is jurisdictional. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n,
693 F.3d at 179–80 (majority opinion). While that conflation is not uncommon, it is immensely harmful to the
discussion. The zone of interests may be seen as prudential standing, but the reverse is not true⎯prudential
standing encompasses more than the zone of interests test. This conflation is the equivalent of labeling all
whiskey “bourbon” or all fruit “oranges.” The practical importance can be seen in the Supreme Court’s
holding that other doctrines of prudential standing are not jurisdictional. See infra Part III, nn.300–01 and
accompanying text. In this sense, the panel’s decision is flatly wrong. Accordingly, this Comment will use the
labels with more precision.
19 See infra Part III.A.
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 See, e.g., Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 102
(2009) (“[T]he actual application of the zone of interests test, in contrast to the way it is often described,
supports the view that it should be understood as nothing more than an interpretation of the APA.” (footnote
omitted)). But see Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009)
(arguing that constitutional standing provisions should be absorbed into the prudential analysis).
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pivotal in determining how the zone of interests test functions in light of the
Court’s recent articulation of jurisdiction. In parsing the zone of interests test
to determine whether it is jurisdictional, the circuit courts have failed to give
proper credence to the Supreme Court’s clearly articulated view that the test is
prudential. However desirable and important it may be, prudential standing,
properly understood in the context of the larger prudential body of law, cannot
function in a jurisdictional manner under the Court’s recent cases.
Accordingly, the zone of interests test cannot, and should not, be used by
courts to abdicate jurisdiction over a case or controversy.
To that end, Part I of this Comment examines the development of the zone
of interests test, tracing the Court’s justification for it at each iteration. It will
give particular attention to whether the test is constitutional, statutory, or
prudential. Part II examines the Court’s recent movement to refine jurisdiction,
focusing on the potential sources for jurisdictional rules. It will explain how
the Court analyzes those sources to determine whether they are jurisdictional,
deducing an essential framework for application.
Part III applies the new framework of jurisdiction to the salient points of
prudential standing, concluding that the two doctrines function in a
complementary but distinct fashion. It then presents compelling examples of
this distinction and addresses why the zone of interests test functions more
efficiently when viewed as a prudential standing doctrine. Ultimately, this
Comment concludes that the zone of interests test, as currently defined, is a
prudential standing doctrine and cannot function in a jurisdictional manner.
I. THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST AS A PRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE
The zone of interests test can be succinctly stated: “The interest [the
plaintiff] asserts must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute’ that he says was violated.”22 However, that simple
phrase belies the complexity and deep unrest implicated by the doctrine. The
zone of interests test has been called many things in its forty-three years of
existence, both by the Court and its commentators.23

22 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)
(quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
23 See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987) (“The ‘zone of interests’ formula in
Data Processing has not proved self-explanatory . . . .”).
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Despite the criticism, the Court has long classified the zone of interests test
as a prudential doctrine24⎯a prudential doctrine being one that is judgemade.25 Some commentators, however, reject this prudential gloss and instead
argue that the test is ultimately a statutory imposition required by the APA.26
The Court’s language at times could be read to support such an interpretation.27
Thus, understanding the source of the zone of interests test stands as the first
stop in determining whether it should be read to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts.
This section catalogs a few of the more important and divergent cases,
focusing on the Court’s treatment of the zone of interests test with respect to its
prudential classification and distinct role in the standing evaluation.28
Particular attention will be given to the Court’s justification for creating and
utilizing the zone of interests test. This section will begin by examining the
seminal case for the test, Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp.29 Then it will move to subsequent cases that sent
conflicting messages about the test’s prudential status. Finally, it will examine
the most recent cases concerning the zone of interests test, which lead to the
conclusion that the test is a category of prudential standing.
A. The Inception of the Zone of Interests Test
The zone of interests test first appeared in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp.30 In Data Processing, the plaintiffs, sellers of
data processing services, challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency that allowed banks to sell the same services.31 The plaintiffs alleged
this ruling was in violation of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, § 4,
24

See infra Part I.
33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8413 (2006)
(“Prudential considerations are limitations on the courts’ power that the judiciary itself has devised . . . .”).
Wright and Koch describe the application of prudential considerations as “discretionary” and grounded in a
desire to limit judicial intervention to disputes where a decision would be meaningful. See id. (“Simply
because the Constitution gives courts power does not mean that it is either wise or necessary for them to
exercise that power.”).
26 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 341 (2004); see also Pathak, supra note 21
at 102.
27 See infra Part I.B.
28 For an in-depth treatment of the less prominent cases not addressed herein, as well as the lower court
reactions, see Siegel, supra note 26, at 319–41. See generally Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the
“Zone of Interests” Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447 (discussing the early zone of interests cases).
29 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
30 Id. at 153.
31 Id. at 151.
25
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which stated, “No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other
than the performance of bank services for banks.”32 The trial court dismissed
the case, finding the plaintiffs lacked standing.33 The court of appeals
affirmed.34 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had
standing and the case should be heard on the merits.35 The Court’s opinion in
Data Processing highlights two considerations that are salient to this
Comment: (1) the development of the Court’s bifurcated standing analysis and
(2) the role of prudential considerations in that standing analysis.
First, the Court delineated a new, bifurcated framework for determining
standing in APA cases. The Court abandoned its prior framework, the legal
interest test,36 and instead required the plaintiff to suffer harm cognizable
under both Article III of the Constitution and the review portions of the APA.37
The first prong of the new standing framework emphasized the constitutional
requirement that a plaintiff sustain an “injury in fact.”38 The plaintiffs satisfied
this requirement by showing they would suffer financial harm through direct
competition from the banks.39 The second prong of the standing analysis
examined “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question.”40 The Court made clear that this
second prong was not mandated by the Constitution by stating that it stood
32

Id. at 155 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964)).
Id. at 151.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 158.
36 Id. at 153. The legal interest test can be described as withholding standing “‘unless the right invaded is
a legal right,⎯one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
137–38 (1939)). The Court held that the legal interest test went to the merits of a case rather than a litigant’s
standing. Id. at 153. Interestingly, the Court proceeded to find the plaintiff’s interest within the zone of interest
through the statutory/congressional intent framework. Id. It then stated: “We do not put the issue in those
words, for they implicate the merits. We do think, however, that § 4 arguably brings a competitor within the
zone of interests protected by it.” Id. at 156.
37 Id. at 153.
38 Id. at 152. This is the foundation of the modern Article III standing analysis, which requires injury in
fact, causation, and redressability. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 320.
39 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
40 Id. at 153. Ensuing confusion over this bifurcation is hardly surprising given the fact that the Court
seemed confused itself when explaining standing. It observed earlier in the same opinion, “Generalizations
about standing to sue are largely worthless . . . . One generalization is, however, necessary and that is that the
question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts
judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Id. at 151. Yet, it folded concerns “apart from the ‘case’ or
‘controversy’ test” directly into the standing evaluation. See id. at 153. Given the conflation, it seems even this
generalization was “largely worthless.”
33
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“apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test.”41 Applying the second prong, the
Court interpreted the language of the APA as “grant[ing] standing to a person
‘aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’”42 In the
Court’s opinion, the relevant statute, the Bank Services Corporation Act of
1962, brought the plaintiffs’ interest within its zone of interests.43 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs satisfied both prongs of the standing analysis.
Second, the Data Processing Court discussed the foundation for the nonconstitutional second prong of the standing inquiry⎯prudential considerations.
Acknowledging the broad reviewability provisions of the APA, the Court
intimated a desire to somehow limit the growing class of those permitted to
challenge agency action.44 To that end, it wrote, “Apart from Article III
jurisdictional questions, problems of standing, as resolved by this Court for its
own governance, have involved a ‘rule of self-restraint.’”45 The Court had
previously used that exact language to describe its prohibition on litigants
bringing claims based on the rights of third parties.46 By applying the same
language to the zone of interests test, the Court grouped it alongside that
prohibition.47 The Court did not use the term “prudential” to describe either
doctrine at that point.48 However, it clearly voiced its ability to decline certain
questions based on the wisdom of doing so, rather than out of constitutional
necessity.49
Justice Brennan concurred in the result but strongly dissented from the
majority’s creation of a two-tiered standing inquiry.50 For Justice Brennan, the
41

Id.
Id. at 153–54 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1964)).
43 Id. at 156.
44 See id. at 154.
45 Id. (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)).
46 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255. It is worth noting that the Barrows language clearly distinguished
jurisdictional issues from those of “judicial self-restraint.” Id. (“Apart from the jurisdictional requirement, this
Court has developed a complementary rule of self-restraint for its own governance . . . .” (emphasis added)).
The Data Processing opinion muddled this clarity.
47 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154 (quoting Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255).
48 See id. With regard to standing, the term “prudential” has a less than clear history. Judge Fletcher
attributed its ascent to common usage to Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues.” See William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 252 (1988) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 111 (2d ed. 1986)). Originally, Bickel used the term to describe the Supreme Court’s discretion in
crafting its docket. Id. It is now far more broadly applied to all courts’ discretion. Id. In any event, the idea of
judicial “self-restraint” dates back for some time. See, e.g., Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255. But, the Court did not
affix the “prudential” label to any of these doctrines of self-restraint until the mid-1970s. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
49 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
50 See id. at 167–68 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting).
42
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only standing requirement consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence was that
of the constitutional injury in fact.51 By imposing the zone of interests test, the
majority “perpetuat[ed] the discredited requirement” that the plaintiff show a
legally protected interest to establish standing.52 Moreover, Justice Brennan
argued that the majority “encourage[d] more [instances of confusing merits
with standing] by engrafting its wholly unnecessary and inappropriate second
step upon the constitutional requirement for standing.”53 He acknowledged the
need for the statutory inquiry but proposed that it be performed, independent of
the standing inquiry, as an “aspect of reviewability.”54 Justice Brennan
preferred to keep the merits and standing inquiry separate and viewed their
merger as likely to “encourage[] badly reasoned decisions.”55
The zone of interests test appeared in twelve additional cases in the
1970s.56 However, with few exceptions, each subsequent case added little to
the original test for actions brought under the APA.57 The Court did, however,
make a notable expansion of the test to actions not brought under the APA
when it required that a plaintiff’s injury fall within the zone of interests of the
Commerce Clause.58 Additionally, Justice Brennan continued to protest the use
of the test for the reasons set forth in his Data Processing dissent.59

51

Id. at 168 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
Id. at 168.
53 Id. at 169.
54 Id. (emphasis removed).
55 See id. at 170.
56 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 321 n.3 (1977); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 111 (1976); Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16 (1974); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 469 (1974); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733
(1972); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 641 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,
400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 159 (1970).
57 See Siegel, supra note 26, at 320–24 (discussing subsequent cases and their failure to clarify the test).
58 See, e.g., Bos. Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 320–21 n.3 (applying the zone of interests to the Commerce
Clause). The application of the zone of interests test to the Commerce Clause was just the first of many
subsequent applications to cases not involving the APA. This facet of the zone of interests test has sparked its
own body of literature and, while intriguing, is too broad a discussion to include in this Comment.
59 See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 235–36, 238 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The risk of ambiguity and
injustice can be minimized by cleanly severing, so far as possible, the inquiries into reviewability and the
merits from the determination of standing.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Barlow, 397 U.S. at
176)).
52
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B. Confusion in Its Development
While cases in the initial decade of the zone of interests test might not have
shed much light on its application, they were mostly uniform. Moving into the
1980s, however, the Court authored opinions that seemed to present divergent
perspectives on the source of the test. The Court ratified the doctrine as
prudential early in the decade.60 However, in attempting to clarify bubbling
circuit confusion, it later embraced a view that relegated the zone of interests
test to a rule of statutory interpretation that relied on congressional intent.61
Although the Court laid the groundwork for treating the zone of interests
test as prudential in Data Processing, it did not explicitly refer to the test as
such in the 1970s.62 The Court, however, officially adopted the “prudential”
label in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., a case concerning taxpayer standing.63 The Court
ultimately decided the case on grounds other than the zone of interests test.64
However, the Court’s inclusion of the test among the prudential standing
doctrines, as well as its subsequent discussion of prudential standing, sheds
more light (for purposes of this Comment) on understanding the zone of
interests test than any previous case.
First, the Valley Forge Court explained that “[t]he term ‘standing’
subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential
considerations.”65 The Court proceeded to list three rules which it deemed
prudential: (1) a plaintiff must assert his own rights and not those of a third
party,66 (2) the Court declines to hear “abstract questions of wide public

60 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
474–75 (1982).
61 See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524 (1991); Clarke v. Sec.
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
62 While not adopted by the Court, Justice Powell had previously written that the zone of interests should
“undoubtedly” be treated as a prudential limitation. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
63 454 U.S. at 475.
64 Instead, the Court found the plaintiff lacked standing under Article III, obviating the need to address
any prudential standing deficiency. See id. at 485–86 (“[The plaintiffs] fail to identify any personal injury
suffered by them . . . other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III . . . .”).
65 Id. at 471. Notably, this approach differed from the Court’s previous generalization that standing
should be analyzed in the Article III framework alone. See supra note 40. This language signaled the Court’s
full embrace of the bifurcated standing analysis.
66 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
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significance which amount to generalized grievances,”67 and (3) a “plaintiff’s
complaint [must] fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”68
Second, the Valley Forge Court taught that, although prudential standing
considerations are closely related to Article III requirements, they are distinct
concepts and should not be confused.69 The Court explicitly noted that “[the
Article III] requirement states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a
factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called ‘prudential’
considerations.”70 Without explaining the full nature of what “prudential
considerations” were or how they functioned, this treatment clearly
distinguished them from the Article III factors, which limit judicial power.
Accordingly, the Valley Forge Court clarified that the zone of interests test is a
prudential standing doctrine and that prudential standing, unlike constitutional
standing, does not impose limits on judicial power.
Compared to the decade in which the test was conceived, the 1980s saw
few zone of interests cases.71 Given the few cases in which the Supreme Court
utilized, let alone explained, the zone of interests test, lower courts struggled to
apply it.72 However, most courts eventually interpreted the test to require an
inquiry into whether Congress, through the relevant statute, had sought to
benefit the plaintiff.73
The Court set out to correct this misapplication in Clarke v. Securities
Industry Association and, in so doing, provided two important considerations.74
First, the Clarke Court clarified that the bar for satisfaction of the zone of
interests test was lower than what the circuits were requiring.75 Specifically,
67

See id. at 474–75 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 475 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69 See id. (“Merely to articulate these principles is to demonstrate their close relationship . . . . But neither
the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the ‘case or controversy’ requirement should be mistaken
for the rigorous Art. III requirements themselves.”).
70 Id.
71 “Zone of interests cases” should be taken to mean the test was not merely mentioned offhand, but
applied by the Court in some way. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 396–400 (1987); Japan
Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 345–46 (1984). Allen v. Wright mentioned the test, but merely in a way echoing the prudential
classification from Valley Forge. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
72 See Siegel, supra note 26, at 322–24.
73 See id. at 324.
74 479 U.S. 388.
75 See id. at 399–400.
68
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the test was not “to be especially demanding” and “there need be no indication
of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.”76 Accordingly, the
right of review was to be denied only “if the plaintiff’s interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute
that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit.”77
Second, the Clarke Court seemed to view the zone of interests test not as a
prudential doctrine, but rather as a lens of statutory interpretation.
Acknowledging that the test “ha[d] not proved self-explanatory,” the Court
took the opportunity to provide an exegesis of Data Processing.78 At the core
of its discussion, the Court did not mention that the zone of interests test fell
among the prudential standing doctrines or even that it was a doctrine of selfgovernance or self-restraint. Rather, the Court’s only explanation painted the
test as a judicially created gloss on the meaning of APA § 702, which grants
the “aggrieved person” a right of review.79 The Court found this gloss
necessary because it did not perceive Congress intended to allow suit by
“every person suffering injury in fact.”80
Although the Court recognized that it had “occasionally listed the ‘zone of
interest’ inquiry among general prudential considerations bearing on
standing,”81 this was more of an afterthought and did not occur in the exegesis
of the doctrine. With Clarke, the Court indicated that the zone of interests test
was merely a doctrine of statutory interpretation.82 While the distinction
between doctrines of statutory interpretation and prudential considerations
could seem arbitrary, the trickle down impact of a shift like this is difficult to
overstate. Essentially, the Court moved from viewing the zone of interests test
as a limitation created by judicial self-imposition to one imposed upon the
Court by the text of the APA.83 Without the appeal to or exposition of
prudential concerns, the Clarke decision introduced significant ambiguity to
the foundation and function of the zone of interests test.
76

Id.
Id. at 399.
78 See id. at 394–98.
79 See id. at 395.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 400 n.16 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)).
82 See Siegel, supra note 26, at 327.
83 This distinction between external statutory imposition and prudential self-imposition will be
particularly relevant in discussions infra Part III.
77
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Four years later, the Court again decided a case on the zone of interests test
in Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union.84 In
Air Courier, the American Postal Workers Union challenged a Postal Service
ruling that allowed private carriers to participate in “international remailing.”85
The union alleged that the participation of the private companies in the
international mail market would harm its workers’ employment interests.86 The
decision is important for two reasons: (1) for the first time, the Court found
that plaintiffs lacked standing under the zone of interests test87 and (2) again
the Court did not mention prudential considerations in its analysis.
First, after analyzing the statutory scheme, the Court declined to extend
standing to the plaintiffs.88 The first prong of the Court’s standing analysis, the
constitutional injury in fact, was not appealed.89 Thus, the Supreme Court
assumed that the Union had constitutional standing and then sought to
determine whether Congress intended to protect the Union’s interest under the
relevant statute.90 After analyzing the language and history of the statute, the
Court stated that it would not make the “substantial extension” of Clarke and
Data Processing that would be necessary to find the Union within the statute’s
zone of interests.91
The Court dismissed the case on the sole ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing.92 Moreover, this lack of standing was not based on Article III
deficiencies, but merely a failure to satisfy the zone of interests test.93
Ultimately, whether the Court made the correct statutory application makes
little difference. The practical outworking is what matters⎯the decision gave

84

498 U.S. 517 (1991).
See id. at 519–20.
86 See id. at 521.
87 Id. at 530. Only once prior to this case had the Court arguably declined to find a plaintiff’s interest
within the zone of interests. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). But even in Block,
the Court did not explicitly apply the zone of interests test. Rather, it held that “[t]he structure of this Act
implies that Congress intended to preclude [the plaintiff’s] challenges.” Id. at 352.
88 Air Courier, 498 U.S. at 530.
89 See id. at 524. The Postal Service, along with the ACCA, was the petitioner in this case. See id. at 521.
It filed a motion for summary judgment against the Union, which was granted at the trial level. See id. The
appellate court reversed, determining the Union satisfied the zone of interests test. Id.
90 See id. at 524–25 (“We must inquire, then, as to Congress’ intent in enacting the [relevant statutes] in
order to determine whether postal workers were meant to be within the zone of interests protected by those
statutes.”).
91 See id. at 530.
92 See id. at 530–31.
93 See id.
85
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teeth to the Court’s requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of its
standing evaluation.94
Second, throughout the Court’s entire exposition of the zone of interests
test and the relevant statutory material, it did not mention the test as a
prudential doctrine, either explicitly or implicitly.95 Taken in light of Clarke,
the decision’s lack of prudential considerations signaled a full embrace of the
zone of interests test as a tool of statutory interpretation, rather than a judicially
created doctrine of prudence. Air Courier, thus, was the high-water mark for
viewing the zone of interests test independently from its prudential origins.96
C. Recent Cases: Consistently Applying the Zone of Interests Test as a
Prudential Requirement
Although the Clarke and Air Courier decisions seemed to direct the zone of
interests test away from its prudential roots, the Court reclaimed the test’s
heritage beginning with Bennett v. Spear,97 a unanimous opinion.98 Cases
following Bennett, up to the present, have shown that the Court continues to
articulate the zone of interests test as a prudential standing requirement.
The Bennett Court raised three important considerations. Primarily, it
addressed whether the Endangered Species Act’s citizen suit provision99
abrogated the zone of interests test, allowing any citizen, more or less, to bring
suit under it.100 In the end, the Court found the language of the statute⎯“any
person may commence a civil suit”101⎯to be purposefully broad and inclusive,
relaxing the zone of interests entirely.102 It reasoned, “Congress legislates
against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies

94

Even at this point, however, the Court did not refer to the requirement as jurisdictional. See id.
See id. at 529–31.
96 Even so, the Court never described the zone of interests test as an imposition from the APA. Rather, it
felt the gloss on the statute necessary to effectuate what it perceived was congressional intent to limit the
growing class of litigants. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395 (1987).
97 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
98 Id. at 156.
99 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
100 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 161.
101 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1).
102 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164–66.
95
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unless it is expressly negated.”103 Thus, Congress intended the citizen suit
provision to establish an express negation.104
Second, and more salient to this discussion, the Court returned to the
prudential bedrock of the zone of interests test. Prior to reaching the conclusion
on the negation of the test, Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous Court,
dedicated nearly two pages to recapping and summarizing its place within the
Court’s jurisprudence.105 Again dividing standing into constitutional and
prudential considerations, the Court reaffirmed that the zone of interests test is
“judicially self-imposed,” rather than an “immutable requirement[] of Article
III.”106 Moreover, the Court affirmed that it “specifically listed [the zone of
interests] among other prudential standing requirements of general
application,” showing its view that the zone of interests test stands among the
two other categories of prudential standing⎯the prohibition against third-party
standing and the refusal to hear generalized grievances.107
Third, Bennett presented the Court with perhaps its only explicit
opportunity to confront whether prudential standing, specifically the zone of
interests test, should be read as a jurisdictional limitation on the courts. The
case came before the Court after the district court dismissed it for a lack of
jurisdiction, determining the plaintiffs lacked standing under the zone of
interests test.108 The court of appeals affirmed.109 This posture presented a
unique opportunity for the Court to clarify whether the test was jurisdictional.
However, the Court did not address the question because it reversed the lower
courts, finding that the plaintiff did have standing under the zone of interests
test.110
After Bennett the Court has shown no intention to back away from the
classification of the zone of interests test as prudential. Nor has the Court shied
away from the bifurcated standing analysis. In fact, the Court has seemed to
103

Id. at 163. The possible implications of this paragraph will be discussed subsequently. See infra Part

III.C.
104

See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163–64.
See id. at 162–63.
106 See id. at 162.
107 See id. at 162–63. This quoted language was in specific reference to the zone of interests test’s
applicability across all statutory and constitutional provisions, as opposed to just the APA. See id.
108 Id. at 160–61.
109 Id. at 161.
110 See id. at 166. While the avoidance may have been either intentional or arbitrary, perhaps the fact that
jurisdiction was not quite in focus yet had something to do with the aversion. The Court did not take up the
jurisdictional fight until the following year. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
105
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take both for granted.111 For instance, in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow,112 the Court explained the two-fold standing inquiry⎯constitutional
and prudential⎯and then listed the zone of interests test in the prudential
category.113 The Court reaffirmed prudential standing as “judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”114 Moreover, it
described prudential concerns as “closely related to Art. III concerns but
essentially matters of judicial self-governance.”115
Most recently, the Court decided Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak.116 In Patchak, the Secretary of the Interior
sought to acquire property for a band of Pottawatomi Indians under 25 U.S.C.
§ 465.117 The band intended to use the land for gaming purposes.118 Patchak, a
resident who lived “in close proximity” to the property, challenged the action,
asserting the acquisition was not authorized by § 465.119 The band and
Secretary countered that Patchak lacked prudential standing.120
The Court found that Patchak did in fact satisfy the zone of interests test.121
Three facets of the analysis shed light on the Court’s current view of the test.
First, the Court took for granted that the test is a form of “prudential standing.”
It implicitly endorsed the use of the term by the defendants and utilized the
term to describe the test.122 Second, it affirmed the view that standing, at least
in APA cases, always requires both Article III injury-in-fact and satisfaction of

111 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (“[P]rudential standing is satisfied when the injury
asserted by a plaintiff arguably falls within the zone of interests . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
113 See id. at 11–12.
114 See id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 Id. at 12 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). The Court ultimately dismissed the case
under its long-standing practice of refusing to hear matters hinging upon family law disputes. See id. at 17–18.
However, the majority took the opportunity to fold this practice into the prudential standing body of law, a
decision that drew strong criticism from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas. See id. at
18–19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
116 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
117 See id. at 2203.
118 Id.
119 See id. at 2203. Patchak alleged no personal stake in the property to be acquired, but rather destruction
of his lifestyle through “increased traffic, increased crime, decreased property values, an irreversible change in
the rural character of the area, and other aesthetic, socioeconomic, and environmental problems.” See id. at
2203–04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 Id. at 2210.
121 See id. at 2210–11.
122 See id. at 2210.
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the zone of interests test.123 Third, citing Clarke, it affirmed that the threshold
for the test is low.124
In light of these recent cases, three principles are evident. First, the zone of
interests test is a prudential doctrine⎯one self-imposed by the Court for its
own governance. It is clearly not a constitutional imposition. Although the
Clarke and Air Courier decisions indicated that the zone of interests test
sprung from statutory imposition, the Court never explicitly rejected the test as
a prudential limitation. From Bennett to the present, the Court has implicitly
rejected the statutory imposition reading by consistently describing the zone of
interests test as prudential. Second, the Court requires that the plaintiff fall
within the zone of interests of the relevant statute to secure a right of review
when challenging under the APA. Mere satisfaction of the Article III standing
component is not enough. Third, the Court is emphatic that the test be satisfied
when prudential standing is raised, but it has never referred to the test as
jurisdictional. Although the Court had an explicit opportunity to address
whether the zone of interests test is jurisdictional, the Court declined to take it
by finding the plaintiff within the zone of interests and reversing the
jurisdictional dismissal. Ambiguity remains then as to whether the Court
considers the test jurisdictional.
II. JURISDICTION’S NEW SCOPE
This Comment has shown why the zone of interests test is categorized as a
prudential doctrine.125 However, that categorization mattered little for purposes
of determining the doctrine’s jurisdictionality until recently. Twenty years ago,
as the Bennett decision indicates,126 the question of whether prudential
standing was jurisdictional would not have been appropriate (or even material)
because of the loose construction most courts gave to jurisdiction.127 Over the
last fifteen years, the Court has recognized the haphazard application of
jurisdiction and the egregious consequences associated with that
misapplication.128 In remedy, the Court has sought to curtail what it deemed

123

See id.
See id.
125 See supra Part I.
126 See supra note 110.
127 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (acknowledging that even the Supreme
Court had misused the term).
128 See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510.
124

REVELL GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:14 PM

PRUDENTIAL STANDING

239

“‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings.’”129 Beginning with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment in 1998,130 the Court has regularly spoken, albeit indirectly
at times, to the definition of jurisdiction, gradually building a repository of
what it is and what it is not.
Accordingly, the zone of interests test’s prudential status does not end the
inquiry into its jurisdictional status. Rather it advances the discussion to the
question of what sources the Court considers appropriate sources of
jurisdiction. While constitutional provisions have long been viewed as such,
this discussion will illustrate that less-than-constitutional rules can be
jurisdictional as well. The purpose of this section, then, is to sort through the
relevant portions of two recent groups of cases, assembling a coherent and
contemporary framework of jurisdiction.
A. The Harsh Consequences of Jurisdictional Deficiency
The first group of cases outlines the stringent boundaries and harsh
consequences of jurisdiction. These might be said to embody the general legal
community’s understanding of jurisdiction and, thus, do not require as much
explanation. Moreover, these cases assure that the popular understanding of
jurisdiction is alive and well in recent applications.
In United States v. Cotton, an appeal out of the Fourth Circuit questioned
the Fourth Circuit’s precedent that defective indictments were jurisdictional.131
The Supreme Court held that deficiencies in an indictment are not a
jurisdictional limitation on a court.132 The Supreme Court took the opportunity
129 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91
(1998)). The Court applied this label to “unrefined dispositions” that failed to consider “whether the dismissal
should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.” See id. at 511 (quoting Da Silva
v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Moreover, the
Court emphasized that this type of ruling does not hold precedential effect upon its jurisprudence. See id.
(citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91); see also Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (explaining the Court’s effort to
“bring some discipline to the use of [jurisdiction]”); see generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of
“Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/3/LRColl2011n3Wasserman.pdf (examining the recent focus of the Court on
limiting the use of the term “jurisdictional”).
130 523 U.S. 83. Notably, the shift began during the same time frame that the Court moved to fully
embrace the zone of interests test as a prudential doctrine. See supra note 110.
131 See 535 U.S. 625, 629 (2002). The Fourth Circuit had, to that point, relied upon Ex parte Bain, 121
U.S. 1 (1887), a case in which the Court utilized an “elastic concept[ion] of jurisdiction” to remedy
constitutional wrongs it could not have otherwise reached due to the then existing limitations on its review of
criminal convictions. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630. In Cotton the Court overruled Ex parte Bain. Id. at 631.
132 Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630.
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to elucidate two interrelated principles. First, jurisdiction should be understood
as “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”133
Second, the fact that subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s power to
even hear a case means that subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited
or waived.”134
In 2012 the Court decided Gonzalez v. Thaler,135 a case in which it clearly
summarized its current understanding of jurisdiction.136 Reiterating and
drawing from Cotton, the Supreme Court emphasized that “courts are obligated
to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not
presented” when those issues go to subject-matter jurisdiction.137 Moreover,
these objections may be raised at any point throughout the litigation and, if
valid, “lead a court midway through briefing to dismiss a complaint in its
entirety.”138 Such “drastic” consequences mean that jurisdictional infirmity can
waste “[m]any months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court.”139
Thus, the limitations and consequences that the jurisdictional label
connotes are unambiguous. One can imagine how this power (or lack thereof)
might easily become a blunt instrument in courts’ hands. A particularly
difficult or potentially time-consuming case could be jettisoned with a simple
determination by the judge that the court lacks jurisdiction. Alternatively, a
judge might utilize a proposed lack of jurisdiction to further other personal or
policy goals.140 One scholar even suggests that jurisdiction can be construed at
points as a “conclusory label for a judicial refusal to act.”141

133

Id. at 630 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 630.
135 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
136 See id. at 648.
137 See id.; accord Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); cf. Bowles v. Russell 551
U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (explaining that the “Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements”).
138 Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648.
139 Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
140 See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 95–96
(1994) (“The language is a hook that judges use when they want to achieve certain ends, like construing a rule
strictly and literally, or raising a legal issue sua sponte, or engaging in collateral review of another court’s
judgment.”).
141 Id. at 96.
134
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B. Reining in a Severe Doctrine
Perhaps for legitimacy concerns, but certainly to facilitate consistent
jurisprudence,142 the Court has tempered its affirmation of jurisdiction’s strong
effects by steadily articulating the scope of its application. The cases that
follow in this section develop both the scope of application and the reasons
behind that limitation, with particular focus placed upon the
source⎯Constitution or statute⎯of each jurisdictional limitation.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,143 best known for abolishing
the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction,144 provided fodder that became
foundational for the Court’s movement to refine the breadth of jurisdiction.145
The plaintiff-respondent, Citizens for a Better Environment, brought a citizen
suit under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA)146 against the petitioner for past violations involving compliance
with form-filing deadlines.147 The defendant filed the necessary but delinquent
forms prior to the suit.148 Thus, the primary question before the Court was
whether the relevant EPCRA provision, § 11046(a), permitted suit for purely
historical violations.149 While the Court ultimately dismissed the case for want
of Article III standing,150 it took the opportunity to address at least three
pertinent concerns for the refining of jurisdiction.
First, the Court defined jurisdiction, explained its sources, and outlined the
consequences of its absence. Jurisdiction should be understood as the courts’
“power to adjudicate the case.”151 That power can be granted, enlarged, or
142

See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).
523 U.S. 83 (1998).
144 See id. at 94. Hypothetical jurisdiction can be described as the practice of “proceed[ing] immediately
to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more readily
resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction
denied.” Id. at 93.
145 Justice Scalia coined the term “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” in this opinion. Id. at 91.
146 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
147 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 86–87.
148 See id. at 87–88.
149 See id. at 88.
150 See id. at 109–10. The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff lacked constitutional standing to bring
the suit because redress was not possible. See id.
151 Id. at 89. For commentary on the idea of jurisdiction as power, see Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547–48 (2008)
(“[Jurisdiction] can broadly be defined as the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear and
resolve the legal and factual issues in a class of cases.”). But see Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of
Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003) (“[J]urisdiction cannot truly be a matter of power but instead
must be a matter of something like legitimate authority.”).
143
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limited by two sources⎯the Constitution or a statute.152 Drawing from longstanding precedent, Justice Scalia wrote, “Jurisdiction is power to declare the
law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”153 Accordingly, the question
of a court’s jurisdiction must be resolved prior to making any determination on
the merits, hypothetical or otherwise.154 To proceed otherwise would be to
render an advisory opinion.155 The Court leveraged this definition and function
to reform jurisdiction in cases following Steel Co.156
Second, Justice Scalia explained that a clear statutory cause of action was
not required for the court to have jurisdiction.157 He wrote, “It is firmly
established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable)
cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”158
However, the possibility that the averments fail to state a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted does not defeat jurisdiction.159 In Bell v. Hood
the Court established that competing statutory constructions, one of which
would entitle the plaintiff to recover, are sufficient to entertain the case.160
Therefore, in order to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, “the federal
claim . . . [must be] ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions
of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy.’”161
Third, he explained the practical implication that, if differing statutory
constructions could provide or preclude a cause of action, courts would be
forced to enter a hair-splitting interpretative mode to even determine
jurisdiction.162 To “call the existence of a cause of action ‘jurisdictional,’ . . .
would turn every statutory question in an EPCRA citizen suit into a question of
152

See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
See id. at 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
154 See id.
155 See id. at 101.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
157 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89. While the majority found only the (constitutional) standing issue
jurisdictional, Justice Stevens insisted in his concurrence that the issue of whether the relevant statute
permitted the cause of action was equally jurisdictional. See id. at 114–15 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia found this an important enough issue to devote over twelve pages to refuting it. See
id. at 89–102 (majority opinion).
158 Id. at 89.
159 Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
160 See id. (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 685).
161 Id. (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
162 See id. at 92–93.
153
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jurisdiction.”163 Amidst the onslaught of rhetoric, the conclusion from Steel
Co. is plain: the arguable lack of a statutory cause of action is not fatal to
jurisdiction and need not be considered prior to establishing jurisdiction.
Six years later, the Court in Kontrick v. Ryan shed more light on the
jurisdictional question when it considered whether time constraints within the
Bankruptcy Code were jurisdictional.164 Two observations are noteworthy.
First, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Rules were not jurisdictional.165 It
explained that “claim-processing rules [like the Bankruptcy Rules] . . . do not
delineate what cases bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate.”166 Like
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,167 the Bankruptcy Rules do not “extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the courts.”168 The Court explained that the rules are
simply a court-adopted means of properly administering the jurisdiction that
Congress has already given courts.169 In short, the Court created the
Bankruptcy Rules, and they are not jurisdictional.
Furthermore, Kontrick marked the first explicit modern admonition by the
Court for judges and litigants to limit the use of the term “jurisdiction.” The
Court acknowledged the confusion surrounding the “less than meticulous” use
of the term, both within its case law and that of the lower courts170 Taking the
opportunity to recount a few of its missteps in this regard,171 the Court
admonished that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the
label ‘jurisdictional’ . . . only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling
within a court’s adjudicative authority.”172

163

See id. at 92.
See 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).
165 See id. at 454.
166 Id.
167 In describing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court wrote, “‘[I]t is axiomatic’ that such rules
‘do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.’” Id. at 453 (alteration in original) (quoting Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)).
168 See id. at 453–54 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 9030) (internal quotation mark omitted).
169 See id. at 454. The Bankruptcy Rules are by no means a traditional prudential doctrine. However, they
share a thread with prudential standing in that they are used to guide the Court in administering the jurisdiction
the Court already possesses. See supra note 25.
170 See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454.
171 See id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 228–29 (1960) (describing FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)
and FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b), both concerning time enlargement, as jurisdictional)).
172 Id. at 455.
164
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The prominent Title VII case Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.173 implicitly built
upon the foundations laid by Steel Co. and Kontrick. Justice Ginsburg, writing
for an undivided Court, described the case as “concern[ing] the distinction
between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts: federal-court ‘subjectmatter’ jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential ingredients of a
federal claim for relief.”174 Arbaugh brought suit against her former employer,
Y & H Corp., for sexual harassment.175 The trial court returned a verdict for
Arbaugh in the amount of $40,000.176 Y & H then raised, for the first time, that
it could not be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964177 because
it failed to satisfy the fifteen-employee threshold for an employer as defined
under § 2000e(b).178 The trial court dismissed the case, determining that the
statutory threshold for fifteen employees was jurisdictional.179 The court of
appeals affirmed.180 The Supreme Court reversed.181
Overall, the opinion gave two clarifications. First, the Court indicated that
it would not consider every statute Congress enacted as speaking to
jurisdiction. Rather, Congress must clearly state its intention for a statute to
limit jurisdiction in order for the Court to treat it as such. Second, the Court
emphasized the distinction between jurisdiction and the merits of the case,
highlighting the practical consequences.182
After recapping the strong effect of labeling a statute as jurisdictional, the
Court exercised caution by declining to extend the label to the fifteenemployee threshold.183 The Court explained that Congress has the power to
designate any statute as jurisdictional.184 Thus, congressional failure to
designate the relevant Title VII statutes as such indicated that Congress did not
173

546 U.S. 500 (2006).
Id. at 503.
175 Id. at 503–04.
176 Id. at 504.
177 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
178 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504, 509.
179 Id. at 504.
180 Id. at 501.
181 Id. at 516.
182 For a discussion of this distinction, see Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1548 (“Merits, by contrast, are
defined by who can sue whom, what real-world conduct can provide basis for a suit, and the legal
consequences of a defendant’s failure to conform that conduct to its legal duties.”). But see, e.g., Lee, supra
note 151, at 1613 (“I will argue that the conventional wisdom about jurisdiction is misleading, and, on
occasion, dangerous. It is misleading because it is based on a false premise⎯that the true concept of
jurisdiction is distinct from the true concept of the merits.”).
183 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.
184 See id. at 514–15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s “monetary floor”).
174
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intend them to be jurisdictional.185 Therefore, the Court held that unless
Congress clearly ranks a statutory limitation as jurisdictional, courts should not
treat it as such.186 Accordingly, although statutes have the ability to create or
withhold jurisdiction, they are not by default jurisdictional.
Instead, the Court explained that the statutory provision should be seen as
an element of the claim for relief, a merits consideration.187 The effect of this
realization or “bright-line rule,” at least for consideration here, is to shift the
governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) away from a 12(b)(1)188 or
12(h)(3)189 motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.190 The
notable inference is that any statute not “rank[ed]” by Congress as
jurisdictional speaks to the claim for relief191 and is, thus, subject to the motion
to dismiss requirements of FRCP 12(b)(6) as “fail[ing] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”192 Consequently, failure to question the cause of
action under FRCP 12(b)(6) or 12(h)(3)193 constitutes a waiver of the defense
and cannot be remedied by a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court under
FRCP 12(b)(1). While the Court later fleshed out the doctrinal backbone for
this distinction, the mere fact that failure to state a claim is distinct from the
concept of jurisdiction is remarkably important.
While Arbaugh presented a unified front from the Court, Bowles v.
Russell194 proved that not all of the dust of jurisdictional reform had settled.
Only a year after Arbaugh, the Court considered whether statutory deadlines
for the timely filing of an appeal195 were jurisdictional.196 Seemingly at odds
with recent cases, the five–four majority held that the statutory timelines were
185

See id. at 515–16.
Id. at 516.
187 See id. (“Applying that readily administrable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold number
of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional
issue.”).
188 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (indicating that a 12(b)(1) motion must be raised in responsive pleadings).
189 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (indicating that a 12(h)(3) motion may be raised at any point in the litigation).
190 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506–07.
191 See id. at 516.
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
193 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2) provides that a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted may
be raised in the pleadings, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at trial.
194 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
195 The specific statute at issue was 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which allows a district court the discretion to
reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of fourteen days. Id. at 207. The district court properly granted
the motion to reopen but provided the petitioner an erroneously elongated filing date. See id. The petitioner
complied with the erroneous date and, accordingly, filed after time had run out. See id.
196 See id. at 206.
186
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jurisdictional.197 Three aspects of Bowles are helpful in reconciling the case
and understanding its role in the development of jurisdiction: (1) the Court’s
rationale for the jurisdictional label, (2) the Court’s efforts to distinguish
Arbaugh and Kontrick, and (3) the dissent’s response to those arguments.
First, in holding that the appeal filing deadlines were jurisdictional, the
majority relied on two pillars: (1) the Court’s longstanding precedent of
treating statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional, and (2)
Congress’s intention that the statute be ranked as jurisdictional.198 The Court
explained that “even prior to the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, [it]
regarded statutory limitations on the timing of appeals as limitations on its own
jurisdiction.”199 It then cited a history of cases that explicitly treated those
filing deadlines as jurisdictional.200 Moreover, the Court read Congress’s
explicit limitation of time for filing as an indication that it viewed the deadlines
as jurisdictional.201
Second, the majority attempted to distinguish the type of rules addressed in
Kontrick and Arbaugh, which it had held were nonjurisdictional.202 Kontrick,
the Court reasoned, dealt with the Bankruptcy Rules, which were courtdeveloped guidelines to facilitate orderly business.203 Fundamentally, these
were not statutory impositions, thus not appropriately jurisdictional. Arbaugh
received a single sentence: “[T]he statutory limitation was an employeenumerosity requirement, not a time limit.”204 In an effort to retain the doctrinal
backbone of the Court’s jurisprudence, Justice Thomas wrote that “‘subjectmatter’ jurisdiction obviously extends to ‘classes of cases . . . falling within a
court’s adjudicatory authority,’ but it is no less ‘jurisdictional’ when Congress
prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate ‘class of
cases’ after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.”205

197 See id. at 206–07. Regardless of the petitioner’s compliance with the district court’s issued deadline,
the Supreme Court held that the appeal was barred because it was jurisdictionally out of time. See id.
198 See id. at 209–11.
199 Id. at 210.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 213.
202 See id. at 210–13.
203 See id. at 210–11.
204 Id. at 211.
205 Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Unsurprisingly, Justice Souter’s dissent took issue with the majority’s
effort to distinguish the statute at issue as jurisdictional.206 Particularly, Justice
Souter was not persuaded that the rule’s statutory status amounted to
congressional demarcation of jurisdiction.207 Disagreeing with the majority’s
reconciliation efforts, Justice Souter wrote, “A filing deadline is the paradigm
of a claim-processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal courts may
hear, and so it falls outside the class of limitations on subject-matter
jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise.”208
Despite the confusion caused in Bowles, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick209
more or less cleared the air. The Reed Elsevier decision coalesced the twelve
years of intervening cases between itself and Steel Co. into a succinct
framework on jurisdiction210 and reconciled Bowles in a way that was at least
indicative of the Court’s intended direction, if not intellectually satisfying.211
The case concerned an issue similar to Arbaugh⎯whether a litigant’s failure to
satisfy a statutory provision would deprive a federal court of subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.212 The Copyright Act, § 411, states, “no civil
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made.”213 However, several plaintiffs in a class action settlement for copyright
infringement had not registered their copyright.214 Nevertheless, the district
206 Id. at 216–17 (Souter, J., dissenting). Besides the doctrine at stake, the effect of the decision was
unduly harsh, especially considering the fact that Bowles likely relied on an erroneous timeline provided by
the district court. See id. at 206–07 (majority opinion).
207 See id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208 See id. at 218 (responding to the majority’s citation to Kontrick and reconciliation of the definition of
jurisdiction with the holding).
209 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
210 See id. at 1243–45.
211 See id. at 1247–48. Justice Ginsburg provided further clarity in her concurrence. See id. at 1250–51
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Notably, Justice Ginsburg authored the
unanimous opinion in Arbaugh, establishing the bright-line test that highlighted Congress’s role in granting
jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). Concurring in Reed Elseveir, she
acknowledged the tension between Arbaugh and Bowles, going so far as to state that “Bowles moved in a
different direction” than the carefully executed steps toward refinement leading up to and through Arbaugh.
See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1250 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). She
did, however, propose a simple way to reconcile the two cases: Bowles’s reliance on a history of jurisdictional
treatment rested on the same line of cases that Congress had left undisturbed. See id. at 1251. The result is a
sort of implicit endorsement (by congressional inaction) that the statute was jurisdictional.
212 See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1241 (majority opinion). While in Arbaugh the question was whether
the defendant could be sued, the issue in Reed Elsevier was whether the plaintiff met the prerequisites to bring
suit. See id. at 1245.
213 Id. (quoting § 411(a)).
214 Id. at 1242.
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court approved their settlement.215 The defendants did not raise a jurisdictional
challenge at any point during the district court proceedings.216 On appeal, the
court vacated the settlement, holding that the district court did not have
jurisdiction because of the § 411 deficiency.217 The Supreme Court reversed.218
The Court found that a copyright holder’s failure to satisfy the registration
requirement of § 411 did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.219 Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, conscripted the Arbaugh bright-line test to
determine whether the statute was jurisdictional.220 However, what the Court
originally deemed a bright-line test, Justice Thomas appeared to take in three
separate steps. Expositing Arbaugh, he explained that the statute at issue there
did “not ‘clearly stat[e]’ that the employee numerosity threshold on Title VII’s
scope ‘count[s] as jurisdictional.’”221 Nor did the statute, in its text or structure,
“demonstrate that Congress ‘rank[ed]’ that requirement as jurisdictional.”222
Rather than stop at that all-or-nothing determination, he then looked to context
to determine if Congress had implicitly endorsed a long line of the Court’s
cases that held the statute to be jurisdictional.223 However, that question as well
was answered in the negative.224 Consequently, the statute could not be said to
speak to the jurisdiction of the courts and, inferentially, spoke to the merits of
the case.225 Applying that framework to § 414 of the Copyright Act, the Court
found that none of those jurisdictional qualifications existed, making it
nonjurisdictional.226

215

Id.
Id.
217 See id. at 1243.
218 Id. at 1249.
219 Id. at 1241.
220 See id. at 1244–45 (“If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope
shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with
the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should
treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 515, 515–16
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221 Id. at 1244 (alterations in original) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16). Justice Thomas
immediately thereafter stated, “And nothing in our prior Title VII cases compelled the conclusion that even
though the numerosity requirement lacks a clear jurisdictional label, it nonetheless imposed a jurisdictional
limit.” Id. This allusion to the precedential evaluation leaves room for Bowles yet makes for an awkward and
broad substep in the evaluation.
222 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–16).
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 1248.
216
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Three months later, with jurisdiction settling into its own, the Court again
addressed the distinction between merits and jurisdiction in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd.227 The plaintiffs, Australians who had purchased
shares in National Australia Bank, brought suit against it for violations under
§ 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act.228 However, the alleged securities
fraud took place outside the United States.229 The trial court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) because it considered § 10(b)
inapplicable to crimes committed outside the United States.230 The circuit court
affirmed on similar grounds.231 The Supreme Court reversed, holding the
territorial reach of the statute to be a question for the merits.232
Again, the Court considered the issue to be a question of whether the
plaintiff’s allegations entitled him to relief, thus resolvable on a 12(b)(6)
motion.233 One phrase in particular stood out: “The District Court here had
jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b)
applies to National’s conduct.”234 Thus, the question of whether the cause of
action was available to the plaintiffs should have been resolved on the merits,
rather than before reaching them, because it did not impinge upon the
“tribunal’s power to hear a case.”235
Finally, the Supreme Court appears to have landed on what it considers
jurisdictional in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki.236 In Henderson, the
plaintiff missed the statutory 120-day filing deadline237 to appeal a decision of
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to the Veterans Court.238 The Veterans Court
relied on Bowles in holding that the statutory timeline for filing an appeal was
jurisdictional and dismissed the case for a lack of jurisdiction.239 The Federal

227

130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Id. at 2876.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 2877 (explaining that “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question”—it is not a question of whether the court has the power to hear the case).
233 See id.
234 Id. (footnote omitted).
235 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
236 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
237 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006).
238 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1201. Veterans Court is an Article I tribunal that hears appeals from the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7252(a) (2006). Its decisions are appealable to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See § 7292(c).
239 See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
228
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Circuit affirmed.240 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that,
although the filing deadline rule was “important,” it was not jurisdictional.241
The opinion invoked the Arbaugh/Reed Elsevier analysis, looking for any
“clear” indication that Congress ranked the rule as jurisdictional.242 However,
because the context of the statute and the Court’s longstanding treatment of the
rule are sufficiently informative, “Congress, of course, need not use magic
words in order to speak clearly on this point.”243 But, the Court found no clear
words and no congressional intent evident in the structure of the statute to
implicate jurisdiction.244 The rule, therefore, was not jurisdictional.
As demonstrated in Henderson, the Court has now arrived at a seemingly
stable point in its articulation of jurisdiction. It has delineated what jurisdiction
is, how to determine whether something functions as such, and what happens
when it is lacking. Jurisdiction is a court’s legitimate authority to hear a case,
grounded in constitutionally or statutorily granted power.245 This definition
stands in contrast to the rights or responsibilities of the parties⎯causes of
action and the merits of a claim.246 Courts, as a threshold issue, must address
whether they have the power to adjudicate the case, meaning jurisdiction must
be authenticated regardless of whether the parties raise it.247 It is not subject to
exception or waiver.248
Determining the jurisdictional quality of a provision depends on its origin.
Jurisdictional limitations can spring from two foundations⎯Article III of the
Constitution or statutory provisions promulgated by Congress. Article III
limitations are always jurisdictional. However, if the limitation is not of the
Article III ilk, the Court employs a three-step test to determine if Congress
“ranked” the statutory provision as jurisdictional. First, does the text of the
statute speak plainly about jurisdiction? Second, if not, does the context of the
statute indicate that Congress intended the statute to be jurisdictional? Third,
even if the context does not, does a long line of cases from the Court treating
the provision as jurisdictional show congressional acceptance of such a

240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Id.
See id. at 1200, 1206.
See id. at 1203.
See id.
See id. at 1205–06.
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnik, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010).
See id.
See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
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practice? If these are all answered in the negative, the statutory provision may
be important, but not jurisdictional. Instead, these nonjurisdictional statutory
limitations should be seen as going to the merits of the case.
III. PRUDENTIAL STANDING AND THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST: DISTINCT
FROM JURISDICTION
While Article III standing is unquestionably jurisdictional because it is
imposed by the Constitution,249 the Court has yet to explicitly address whether
the second prong of the standing analysis⎯prudential standing⎯bears the
same imprimatur.250 Even without the Court’s explicit pronouncement, some
scholars and judges have assumed that prudential standing is
nonjurisdictional.251 However, several circuits remain unconvinced and
continue to apply the zone of interests test in a jurisdictional manner.252
The confusion is not entirely unwarranted. Several functions or features of
the prudential standing analysis can leave even the attentive reader with the
impression that courts wield prudential standing in a jurisdictional manner. For
example, the discussion of prudential standing often falls in the section of an
opinion that broadly addresses jurisdiction.253 If that were not confusing
enough, the evaluation of prudential standing usually is intertwined with or
immediately follows the discussion of Article III standing, which is
jurisdictional.254 Moreover, courts, including the Supreme Court, have
dismissed cases for a lack of prudential standing in a manner that oddly
resembles a jurisdictional defect.255
249

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–04 (1998).
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A]lthough the Supreme Court
has not yet directly addressed whether prudential standing is jurisdictional, the Court has suggested that it is
not.”), reh’g denied, 704 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013), and cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013), and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2881 (2013).
251 See infra note 278; cf. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) (discussing prudential standing as “subject to
elimination by the Court or by Congress”).
252 See Grocery Manufacturers, 693 F.3d at 185; Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir.
2000); Cmty. First Bank v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1994); Animal Legal Def.
Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248
(2d Cir. 1994).
253 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471 (1982).
254 See, e.g., id. at 472–76.
255 See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 530 (1991). Amidst
this confusion, some scholars have called for the dissolution of the constitutional standing requirement and an
adoption of the prudential “abstention” category to encompass all standing considerations. See, e.g., Heather
250
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Notwithstanding these conflicting signals, prudential standing, although
related to Article III standing, is not jurisdictional in nature. This section will
establish that conclusion by first comparing the respective sources of
prudential standing and jurisdiction, determining that they are complimentary,
but distinct. In illustration of this distinction, it will then provide practical
examples of prudential standing and the broader prudential body of law that
display the nonjurisdictionality of the doctrine. Finally, it confronts potential
difficulties with reading the zone of interests test as nonjurisdictional,
concluding that the test, for doctrinal and practical reasons, best aligns with a
nonjurisdictional reading.
A. Because Prudential Standing Is a Judicial Self-Imposition, It Does Not Fit
in the New Framework of Jurisdiction
First and foremost, the sources of jurisdiction and prudential standing are
distinct. This section will highlight that doctrinal distinction by examining the
opposing language scattered throughout the cases that address each limitation.
It will then explain the effect of that distinction, as observable in Bowles v.
Russell.
Jurisdiction is the power or legitimate authority of the court originating
from one of two sources⎯Article III of the Constitution or a statutory
provision promulgated by Congress.256 Prudential standing, on the other hand,
is not based on constitutional or statutory grounds. From the outset, the Court
distinguished prudential standing from the requirements of Article III.257 Most
subsequent opinions that have broached prudential standing have done so with
similar language, clearly distinguishing the constitutional limitations imposed
by Article III from the prudential reservation of action.258 Moreover, with the
Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 464 (2008); cf. Sohn, supra note 21, at 728 (arguing
that all constitutional standing doctrines be absorbed into the prudential category).
256 See supra Part II.
257 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
258 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[S]ome of [standing’s] elements
express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government . . . .”); Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 475 (“[Article III standing] states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in
the weighing of so-called ‘prudential’ considerations.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“This
inquiry [into standing] involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential
limitations on its exercise.”); see also CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir.
2011) (“Though all are termed ‘standing,’ the differences between statutory, constitutional, and prudential
standing are important. Constitutional and prudential standing are about, respectively, the constitutional power
of a federal court to resolve a dispute and the wisdom of so doing.” (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys., Inc.,
496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007))).
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exception of Clarke and Air Courier, the Court has not moored prudential
standing of any sort to a statutory requirement.
Instead of constitutional or statutory justification, the Court has avowed
that it engages prudential standing considerations for “its own governance” in a
manner involving a “rule of self-restraint.”259 Neither constitutional nor
statutory limitations can be properly described as judicial selfgovernance⎯they are by definition impositions upon the Court from outside
its chambers. Thus, the Court’s effort to administer its docket in an orderly
fashion may run concomitantly with constitutional and statutory limitations,
but it rests in no other justification save that of prudence. While the debate on
whether the Court has the ability to create or police its jurisdiction carries on in
some circles,260 the Court has indicated that it trusts Congress with the
delineation of its statutory jurisdiction and itself for parsing constitutional
jurisdictional bounds.261 Because prudential standing is neither constitutional
nor statutory, it cannot be labeled jurisdictional.
An example from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in this regard is
instructive. Although Bowles did not specifically address prudential standing, it
did illustrate the distinction between Court-developed doctrine and limits
imposed upon the Court from outside its chambers.262 The Bowles Court held
that the statutory timelines for filing appeals were jurisdictional.263 The Court,
however, contrasted those jurisdictional, statutory timelines with the
nonjurisdictional Bankruptcy Rules addressed in Kontrick.264 Both sets of rules
placed procedural time limits on filing in the appropriate court. The difference,
according to the Court, lay in the sources of the limitations. Notably,
“[b]ecause [o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction, it was improper for courts to use the term ‘jurisdictional’ to
describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court [like those at issue in
Kontrick].”265 Thus, in Bowles, the Court explicitly labeled the Bankruptcy
259 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (quoting Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for
Public Actions, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 371 (1993) (discussing Professor Redish’s thesis that the refusal to
hear a case on abstention doctrine grounds abrogates congressional authority in determining jurisdiction).
261 See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–13 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515
(2006).
262 See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210–13.
263 See id. at 206–07.
264 See id. at 210–11.
265 Id. at 211 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
452, 454 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rules as nonjurisdictional because they were created by the Court. That court
creation stands in opposition to not only the immutable requirements of Article
III, but also the clear intent of Congress to put forth a jurisdictional statute.
Moreover, in declining to ascribe jurisdictional import to the Bankruptcy
Rules, the Supreme Court signaled that it could not limit the jurisdiction of the
courts. This prohibition was galvanized with the words, “Within constitutional
bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to
consider.”266 Although the Court was specifically distinguishing the
Bankruptcy Rules (Court made for orderly administration) from appellate
filing deadlines promulgated by Congress, it ultimately taught that jurisdiction
does not appropriately refer to the court’s self-imposition of limitation.
It should be noted that the source of the limitation for each of the prudential
standing doctrines has not remained static. For instance, the prohibition against
bringing generalized grievances has vacillated between a constitutional and
prudential home.267 However, this inconsistency does not contradict the idea
that prudential standing emanates from the Court itself. In fact, one scholar
acknowledges that the Court shifts the doctrine to its prudential home when it
desires more flexibility in application.268 If anything, this pattern emphasizes
the nonjurisdictionality of prudential standing.
B. Practical Illustrations Demonstrate that Prudential Standing Is Not
Jurisdictional
While the Court’s reasoning in Bowles and Kontrick illustrates the
distinction between Court-made doctrines and statutory or constitutional
impositions, it does not specifically extend the distinction to prudential
standing. Although that extension is no stretch, practical examples of the
underlying rationale at work in the Court’s treatment of prudential doctrines
are helpful. This section will first examine examples of exceptions the Court
has made to prudential standing requirements. Second, it will study the flexible
order in which courts engage prudential standing as compared to the required
order for jurisdiction. Third, it will draw from the Court’s recent treatment of
other prudential doctrines besides prudential standing.

266

Id. at 212 (emphasis added); see also supra note 265 and accompanying text.
See Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or
a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1204–14 (2008) (recapping
the Court’s inconsistent view of the proper classification for the generalized grievances prohibition).
268 See id. at 1217.
267
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1. Prudential Standing, Unlike Jurisdiction, Is Subject to Exceptions
In the presence of a jurisdictional defect, a court must dismiss the case
without giving the parties an opportunity for waiver.269 Even the Supreme
Court does not have the power to make exceptions to cure a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, even for compelling equitable considerations.270 Prudential
standing does not function with the same inflexibility and compulsion.
The Supreme Court has waived at least one of the three prudential standing
requirements, the prohibition against third-party standing, in the presence of
“competing considerations.”271 The Court in Warth v. Seldin stated, “In some
circumstances, countervailing considerations may outweigh the concerns
underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff’s
claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties.”272 The Court
emphasized in Craig v. Boren that prudential standing serves specific ends.273
When those ends were not furthered by the application of the doctrine, the
Court did not feel obliged to observe its bounds.274 Moreover, it stated that
adhering inflexibly to the prudential requirements in that instance would
“foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and
prudence.”275
The language surrounding this prohibition is enough to deduce that the rule
is a generality and not an immovable bulwark.276 The Court has affirmed its
understanding of this possibility as recently as 2004.277 While this observation
269

See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (explaining that the “Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions
to jurisdictional requirements”).
271 See, e.g., Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984) (“[T]here are situations
where competing considerations outweigh any prudential rationale against third-party standing, and . . . this
Court has relaxed the prudential-standing limitation when such concerns are present.”).
272 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975). Moreover, the idea that “usual reluctance to exert
judicial power” exists in prudential standing circumstances presupposes that the power exists in those
circumstances. See id. Reluctance necessitates discretion, which is wholly absent in the presence of
jurisdictional limitations.
273 See 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976).
274 See id. at 193 (“These prudential objectives, thought to be enhanced by restrictions on third-party
standing, cannot be furthered here . . . .”).
275 See id. at 193–94.
276 See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987) (“[O]ne of these prudential principles is that the
plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests. That general principle, however, is subject to
exceptions.” (citation omitted)).
277 See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004) (“We have not treated this rule [against thirdparty standing] as absolute . . . .”). Building upon that construction, the Court’s recent articulations on the
doctrine against third-party standing acknowledge that it is not jurisdictional. See infra note 299.
270
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might not fully frame the other two prudential standing doctrines as subject to
exception,278 it does unequivocally teach that the prudential standing umbrella
as a whole is not jurisdictional.
2. Prudential Standing May Be Addressed in a Different Order than
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has not minced words in establishing that courts may
not consider merits questions prior to ensuring proper jurisdiction exists. For
instance, the Steel Co. decision clearly established that a court is not free to
bypass a jurisdictional question to address the merits of a case when it
condemned the use of “hypothetical jurisdiction.”279 Courts, including the
Supreme Court, have not treated prudential standing with the same zealous
supervision.
While the Steel Co. discussion was set in the context of the Article III
question, Justice Scalia did not cabin the prohibition against hypothetical
jurisdiction to issues of constitutional jurisdiction.280 He described the
assumption of “[h]ypothetical jurisdiction” as creating a “hypothetical
judgment,” which is the same as issuing an advisory opinion, a practice long
forbidden.281 The Court’s subsequent opinions have broadly applied the
description of a court’s power as jurisdiction to not only constitutional limits,
but also those imposed by Congress.282 Therefore, “[f]or a court to pronounce
upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has
no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”283
Accordingly, if prudential standing were jurisdictional, a court could not
bypass it to rule on the merits in any given case. It would be an essential
ingredient of the recipe for legitimate authority. The Supreme Court, however,
has not treated it as such. Even while distinguishing cases within Steel Co., the
Court relied on an implicit understanding that prudential standing was not

278 See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 14 (2d ed.
2011) (“[T]he Court itself is free to disregard one of the prudential rules when it thinks it appropriate to do so.
The jus tertii rule [or the prohibition on third-party standing], in particular, often has been disregarded by the
Court in cases that seemed to it proper.”).
279 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see also supra note 144.
280 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 (“The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction
are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers . . . .”).
281 Id. (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
282 See supra Part II.B.
283 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02.

REVELL GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:14 PM

PRUDENTIAL STANDING

257

jurisdictional.284 The courts of appeals, at least those that have addressed it
recently, have decided the prudential-standing-as-jurisdictional question in a
similar manner.285 Even the D.C. Circuit seems to have previously embraced
this rationale and foregone the determination of prudential standing to decide a
case on the easier merits question.286 This ordering of prudential standing
compared to that of jurisdiction displays the difference between the two.
3. Other Prudential Doctrines (Besides Standing) Are Not Jurisdictional
Given the infrequency and terseness with which the Court has explained
prudential standing, especially the zone of interests test, a broader discussion
of prudential, or judge-made, doctrine is helpful. The Court’s recent treatment
of ripeness,287 another justiciability doctrine, illuminates the relationship
between the prudential doctrines, jurisdiction, and waiver.288 Ripeness, like
standing, encompasses both constitutional and prudential considerations. The
Court has recognized that ripeness stems from both “Article III limitations on
judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
jurisdiction.”289 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the
majority took the opportunity to clarify the distinction between those sources
and how that distinction affects jurisdiction and waiver.290 The Court
approached the ripeness question in these two separate steps⎯constitutional
and prudential.

284

See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 3531.15 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he standing question that was put aside involved statutory
standing under the ‘zone of interests’ test, a matter that is not jurisdictional—there is no illogic in the rule that
a merits question can be given priority over a statutory standing question, but not over a constitutional standing
question.”).
285 See Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417–18 (5th Cir. 2012); Indep. Living Ctr. of
S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008); Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d
1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
286 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co.,
523 U.S. 83 (1998)) (“It is, however, permissible to reject a claim on the merits without having explicitly
resolved the prudential standing issue. For one reason, as the Court has explained, overlap between the merits
and prudential standing is sometimes so great as to make any distinction artificial.”).
287 Ripeness determines whether a controversy is at the appropriate stage of development for judicial
review. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 284, § 3532.1 (“The central perception is that courts
should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute.”).
288 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010); see also Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2610 (2010).
289 See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993). This language mirrors the
language of the prudential standing cases, which describe the dual sources of standing as Article III and
prudential concerns. See supra Part III.A, specifically note 265 and accompanying text.
290 See 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010).
AND
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The constitutional analysis was relatively straightforward. The Court took
for granted that the constitutional components of ripeness were
jurisdictional.291 However, the petitioner satisfied the constitutional
component, giving the Court jurisdiction.292
The analysis became more fascinating, however, when the Court raised two
mirror issues relevant to the prudential standing discussion. First, the majority
rejected the argument that a failure to satisfy prudential ripeness should
preclude judicial review.293 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated,
“[W]e reject that argument as waived, and we see no reason to disregard the
waiver.”294 Second, the majority declined to raise the prudential objection on
its own motion in the specific case.295 However, it specifically left open the
possibility that a federal court could raise a motion concerning prudential
ripeness sua sponte in a similar case.296 This absence of obligation reinforces
the argument that the Court does not view the prudential doctrines as
jurisdictional.
The Court decided Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection297 just two months after Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. Again, the Court reiterated that parties could waive ripeness arguments
not implicating constitutional concerns by a failure to raise them.298 It took the
analysis one step further, however, in explicitly stating that ripeness (at least of
the prudential strain) is not jurisdictional.299 Moreover, the Court addressed
prudential ripeness in the same few sentences as the doctrine against thirdparty standing⎯a prudential standing doctrine.300 With little fanfare, the Court
lumped the two doctrines together, writing, “Neither objection [of ripeness or
third-party standing] appeared in the briefs in opposition to the petition for writ
of certiorari, and since neither is jurisdictional, we deem both waived.”301 This
291

See id.
See id.
293 See id.
294 See id. (citation omitted) (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 56 n.4 (2002)).
295 See id.
296 See id. (“We express no view as to whether, in a similar case, a federal court may consider a question
of prudential ripeness on its own motion.”) (citing Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S.
803, 808 (2003) (“[E]ven in a case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be
considered on a court’s own motion.”)).
297 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
298 See id. at 2610.
299 See id.
300 See id.
301 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
292
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nonchalance toward the nonjurisdictionality of the prohibition against thirdparty standing indicates that the Court assumes that prudential concerns,
including those of standing, are nonjurisdictional.
These two cases display the practical outworking of the distinct sources of
limitation between jurisdictional and prudential doctrine.302 More broadly, the
preceding illustrations teach that the Court does not view the prudential
doctrines, standing or otherwise, as limitations on its power to hear a case.
With a sense of symmetry, the Court analyzes external impositions from the
Constitution and Congress303 much more mechanically than it does selfimposed limitations.
C. Overcoming Potential Hurdles for Accepting the Zone of Interests Test as
Nonjurisdictional
Given the conclusions that the zone of interests test is a prudential
doctrine304 and that prudential doctrines are nonjurisdictional,305 it follows that
the zone of interests test cannot be a jurisdictional limitation. While doctrinal
support for this conclusion is compelling, some may see the preservation of
judicial discretion instead of a mandatory blanket test as inefficient.306 This
section will briefly explore one avenue through which the Court could advance
that agenda. In response, it provides both doctrinal and practical reasons why
that approach is inappropriate.
One loophole that the Court might look to exploit is the third step of the
Arbaugh/Reed Elsevier test. That third step allows statutory rules that the
Court has applied as jurisdictional, even without explicit or contextual
congressional admonition to do so, to be jurisdictional if the Court determines
that Congress has implicitly endorsed that application by leaving those cases
unturned.307 This argument could be supported by the Bennett Court’s

302

See supra Part III.A.
Congressional mandates could be said to receive slightly lower deference than constitutional ones, but
only to the extent that Congress must explicitly state that the statute is jurisdictional according to the
Arbaugh/Reed Elsevier analysis. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
304 See supra Part I.
305 See supra Part III.A–B.
306 Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 529 (2012) (arguing that rules, rather than standards, are a more efficient
means to outline jurisdictional boundaries).
307 See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
303
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statement that “Congress legislates against the background of our prudential
standing doctrine.”308
However, the cards are stacked against that application in at least three
ways. First, Bennett dealt specifically with a statute that the Court had treated
as jurisdictional.309 Thus, the Court would have to clearly recast the zone of
interests test as a statutory imposition to apply this exception.310 Second, even
if the Court recast the zone of interests test, the resulting statutory imposition
would merely require that courts search for a cause of action.311 However, the
Kontrick and Arbaugh decisions counsel that the cause of action goes to the
merits of a case and therefore cannot be jurisdictional.312 Finally, the Bennett
exception requires the Court to have treated the statute as jurisdictional in a
long line of its cases.313 The Court’s treatment of the zone of interests test
might have appeared mandatory at points, but it has never treated the test as
jurisdictional.314
Beyond concerns of doctrinal fidelity, the practical efficiency gain of
labeling the zone of interests test jurisdictional would be, at best, overstated. In
fact, retaining the discretionary nature of the zone of interests test is seemingly
more efficient. Were the zone of interests test jurisdictional, courts would be
required to raise it sua sponte if the parties did not, obligating courts to engage
in statutory interpretation to determine jurisdiction in every APA case. Besides
putting the cart before the horse, this practice at times would run dangerously
close to sending courts into what Justice Scalia cautioned against in Steel
Co.⎯requisite and extensive statutory parsing to determine jurisdiction.315

308

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997); see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164.
310 See supra Part I (arguing that the zone of interests is not a statutory imposition).
311 See supra note 15.
312 See supra note 15; see also supra notes 169, 187 and accompanying text.
313 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163.
314 See supra Part I. The Court had explicitly and repeatedly labeled the timelines at issue in Bennett as
jurisdictional. See supra Part I.
315 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 85, 92–93 (1998); see also supra notes 162–
63 and accompanying text.
309
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Instead, treating the zone of interests test as prudential alleviates this
compulsion, saving precious judicial resources when the issue does not appear
relevant. Litigants, then, bear the initial burden of raising the zone of interests
test when the plaintiff may not be arguably within it.316 However, the courts
retain ultimate discretion to raise the test if the litigants fail to do so.317 This
framework leaves little room for the zone of interests test to be ignored when it
matters, yet streamlines the analysis for both the courts and litigants. In the
end, treating the zone of interests test as prudential, not jurisdictional, makes
good sense on doctrinal and practical grounds.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that prudential standing in general, and
specifically the zone of interests test, is not a jurisdictional limitation on the
Court. Jurisdictional limitations stem from either constitutional or statutory
impositions. Prudential standing and the zone of interests test originate from
neither, but instead are based on the judiciary’s self-created and -imposed
restraint. These matters of judicial self-governance should not be employed to
narrow the availability of jurisdiction. Rather, judges should use them as a
guide, but feel free to disregard their general wisdom in order to avoid the
pernicious consequences that the Court cautioned against in its development of
jurisdiction⎯waste of judicial resources, prejudice to litigants, and months of
wasted work.318
To this point, clarity on courts’ appropriate use of prudential standing to
dismiss cases has been encumbered by the absence of an adequately clear
doctrine of jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court’s recent illumination of
jurisdiction leaves no room for the lower courts to dismiss zone of interests
cases on jurisdictional grounds, claiming they lack the power or ability to
adjudicate them. Unfortunately, in June 2013, the Court declined the
opportunity to clarify the zone of interests test, perpetuating the contentious
circuit split, when it denied certiorari to Grocery Manufacturers. Lower courts
need guidance and the Court should provide it, clarifying the zone of interests

316

In Grocery Manufacturers, EPA did not raise the zone of interests test. See supra note 14. Had the
issue been one worth briefing, the EPA, which is well versed in administrative law standing requirements,
would have certainly raised it.
317 Cf. supra note 296 and accompanying text (explaining courts’ ability, but not compulsion, to raise
prudential concerns sua sponte).
318 See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
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test in the same manner as it has jurisdiction, at a minimum holding that the
test is not jurisdictional.
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